The Carignan Case: A Study of the McNabb Rule by Kotin, Lawrence L.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 42
Issue 3 September-October Article 6
Fall 1951
The Carignan Case: A Study of the McNabb Rule
Lawrence L. Kotin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence L. Kotin, The Carignan Case: A Study of the McNabb Rule, 42 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 351 (1951-1952)
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
Prepared by students of Northwestern
University School of Law, under the
direction of student members of the
Law School's Legal Publication Board
D. H. Reuben, Editor
THE CARIGNAN CASE: A STUDY OF THE McNABB RULE
Lawrence L. Kotin
Since 1942, it'has been generally thought that a confession is inadmissible
in the federal courts, if secured during a period of illegal detention resulting
from the failure of arresting officers to promptly arraign the accused.1 This
rule of evidence, commonly known as the McNab rule, was established by the
Supreme Court as an exercise of its supervisory powers over the administra-
tion of justice in the federal courts.2 It was unnecessary, consequently, to
determine whether or not the arraignment requirement constituted a funda-
mental right secured by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the consti-
tution of the United States.
Prior to its inception, a voluntary-trustworthy test for confessions pre-
vailed. Briefly stated, admissibility was made to depend upon whether or
not the confession was freely and voluntarily made without having been
induced by the expectation of any promised benefit or by the fear of any
threatened reprisal.3 Unlike the McNabb rule, any confession so coerced was
regarded as basically unfair and said to offend the guaranties of due process.4
Despite the voluntary-trustworthy test, police abuses of accused persons con-
tinued to flourish and it is generally conceded that these abuses gave rise to
the McNabb rule.5
The McNabb rule, standing alone, needed clarification and in United
States v. Mitchell6 the court further explained that a confession was admissi-
Editor's Note: The Supreme Court in U.S. '. Carignan, 20 U.S.L. Week 4013
(U.S. Nov. 13, 1951) affirmed the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the
trial court had erred in not permitting Carignan to testify, in the absence of the
jury, as to the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the confession. The
majority also took the view that the confession was procured during a period of
lawful detention and thus did not violate the McNabb rule. Justices Douglas, Black
and Frankfurter concurred in the result but were of the opinion that the McNabb
rule had been violated.
1. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942) (Defendants, a clan of uneducated
Tennessee mountaineers, were arrested for the murder of a federal officer. In disregard
of a statute requiring arraignment, they were taken to the detention room of the Federal
Building and questioned intermittently, singly and together, for two days until confessions
were secured).
2. Id. at 340.
3. Some courts regarded the trustworthiness of the confession as a matter relating
to the admissibility of evidence and consequently to be decided by the judge. People v.
Calseg, 311 Ill. 365, 143 N.E. 105 (1924) ; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114 (1894).
Others by proper instructions, allowed the jury to consider the question. People v. Pantano,
239 N.Y. 416, 146 N.E. 646 (1925); Henry v. State, 151 Ark. 620, 237 S.W. 454 (1922).
4. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search .4nd Seizure, Federalism And The Civil Liberties,
45 ILL. L. RaV. 1, 25 (1950).
5. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma In The United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L.
RaV. 442, 443 (1948).
6. 322 U.S. 65 (1944) (Defendant was arrested as a housebreaking suspect. Upon his
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ble if voluntarily rendered prior to a period of "illegal detention." Thus,
a confession rendered during a period of time reasonably necessary to reach
a committing magistrate was held admissible though a period of unnecessary
delay and hence illegal detention followed. Since, in the Mitchell case, the
confession was admitted though there had been illegal delay between arrest
and arraignment, many federal courts focused their attentions on the treat-
ment accorded the prisoner prior to his arraignment rather than to the dura-
tion of the period prior to arraignment. 7 This failure to take cognizance
of the necessity for bringing the accused before a committing magistrate
provoked the most recent interpretation of the rule by the Supreme Court in
Upshaw v. United States,8 wherein the court ignored the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation and ruled that the reasonable time necessary to
take the prisoner before a committing magistrate had expired and a period
of illegal detention had arisen rendering the confession inadmissible.
Ever changing fact situations have given rise to two discernible applica-
tions of the McNabb rule by the federal courts. Some courts have concen-
trated on the nature of the delay which preceded the arraignment and
admissibility of the confession has been made to depend upon whether or
not the delay was necessary. 9 Others have applied a "totality of circum-
stances" test to each confession and hold the arraignment requirement, as
set forth in the McNabb, Mitchell and Upshaw cases, becomes but one of the
many circumstances to be considered in determining whether or not the con-
fession was voluntary.'0
While the law is in this state of uncertainty, a case was presented to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which reflected the storm
center of the confession controversy. In Carignan v. United States,1 the
defendant, a youth of 22 who had spent most of his boyhood in juvenile
detention homes, was arrested on a charge of attempted rape. Without unnec-
essary delay, he was taken before a magistrate, advised of his rights and given
a preliminary hearing. Thereafter, being held to answer, he remained in
custody in the city jail. He was brought, by the police, to the office of a
United States Marshal who, acting as his confident and friend, questioned
him about another crime, a murder which had been committed six weeks prior
to the attempted rape and under very similar circumstances. Three days
after the questioning began, the prisoner confessed to the murder. On appeal,
two of the three Circuit Court Judges, Healy and Bone, ruled the confession
inadmissible, but on different grounds. Judge Healy utilized the "totality of
circumstances" test and held the confession inadmissible because all the
circumstances indicated the United States Marshal had so inculcated himself
upon the youthful defendant that he had become his "father confessor." The
failure to take the defendant for a preliminary examination, prior to the
time the confession was obtained, was but one of the many factors indicating
arrival at the police station, he immediately confessed. Eight days thereafter, he was
arraigned).
7. Note, 62 HARV. L. REv. 696, 697 (1949).
8. 335 U.S. 410 (1948) (Defendant was arrested on Friday at 2 A.M.. During the
following 31 hours, he was questioned intermittently by two police officers, for periods not
longer than 30 minutes in length, until his confession was obtained. He was arraigned on
the following Monday).
9. Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Garner v. United States, 174
F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 248 (2nd Cir. 1944).
10. Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Wheeler v. United States,
165 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
11. 185 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1950).
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the confession was tainted with wrongdoing. Circuit Judge Bone tended
toward a "strict" approach and though he felt the confession was otherwise
voluntary, he felt bound by the McNabb rule and voted for reversal on the
sole ground that there had been no arraignment on the murder charge prior
to the confession thereon. Judge Pope dissented, arguing that the confession
was voluntary and was rendered during a period of "legal detention" inso-
much as the defendant was in lawful custody on the prior charge. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'2
The Supreme Court is presented with varied alternatives in the dispo-
sition of the Carignan case. First, they may ignore the arraignment problem
and rule that the United States Marshal's actions amounted to coercion and
rendered Carignan's confession untrustworthy. The facts show that the mar-
shal made a strong appeal to Carignan's religious conscience as he "asked him
to look into the eyes of the pictured Christ, and in effect suggested to him
the advisability of setting himself right with his Maker by confessing the
truth concerning his misdoing. "13 Whether or not such tactics amount to
unlawful coercion is a question which has never been settled by the courts.
L4
Another course-that of overruling the McNabb decision-is suggested upon
analyzing the present composition of the court. In 1948, four justices dis-
sented from the UZpshaw doctrine,' 5 and these justices sit on the court today.
Of the five justices comprising the majority on the Upshaw case,' 6 two have,
been succeeded by Justices Clark and Minton. 17 If but one of these new-
comers turns in the direction of the Upslhw dissent, the dissenters would
then comprise a majority of the court.'8 As another alternative, the court
may intend the (arignan, case as a device for further clarifying the McNabb
rule. Pursuant to that rule, whether or not a confession was secured during
a period of illegal detention is the principle criterion for determining the
admissibility of the confession. The present confusion in the federal courts
stems from the desire of some courts to utilize the "totality of circum-
stances" test where, as under the earlier voluntary-trustworthy test, greater
room is afforded to the judge for the use of his discretion. It is interesting to
note that utilization of this view is in close harmony with the mandate of the
dissenters in the Upshaw case.' 9 The Supreme Court might point out the proper
test to be applied by the courts in their attempts to carry out the edict of the
McNabb case.
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proeddure 20 provides, in part,
12. 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3006 (U.S. July 14, 1951).
13. Carignan v. United States, 185 F.2d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 1950).
14. The problems that are presented upon an appeal to one's religious beliefs are
treated in 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §840 (3rd ed. 1940).
15. Justices Reed, Jackson, Burton and Vinson.
16. Justices Frankfurter, Rutledge, Douglas, Black and Murphy.
17. Justices Murphy and Rutledge were succeeded by Justices Clark and Minton,
respectively.
18. Mr. Justice Clark was Attorney General of the United States at the time of the
Upshaw case.
19. 335 U.S. 410, 429 (1948). Also see for other support of this view, Inbau, The
Confession Dilemma In The United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442, 463 (1948).
20. Rule 5 provides: (a) "An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a
complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before
any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the
laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before
a commissioner or any officer, a complaint shall be filed, forthwith."
(b) "The commissioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his
right to retain counsel and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He shall also
19SI]
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that all arrested persons must be brought before a committing magistrate
"without unnecessary delay." This arraignment requirement has as its pri-
mary purpose the prevention of secret interrogation. 21 At the arraignment
the accused is released from the control of the arresting officers and placed in
custody. At this point he has been fully informed of his rights and may have
the advice and presence of counsel. The opportunity for prolonged interro-
gation, physical brutality or idle threats and promises is practically extin-
guished.
22
Assuming that the United States Supreme Court will desire to further
clarify the McNabb-Upshaw rulings, stress ought be placed upon the fact that
any evidence secured through a violation of a federal statute is inadmissible.
2 3
Thus, Rule 5, as a federal statute, is an integral part of the federal confession
rule.2 4 The "totality of circumstances" test will then fail since a failure to
comply with Rule 5, in itself, creates illegal detention-the fruits of which (a
confession) cannot be accepted into evidence regardless of other surrounding
circumstances.
By the inclusion of the phrase "without unnecessary delay," Rule 5 accords
with the Mitchell case and provides what seems to be a reasonable exception
by allowing for the time necessary to reach a committing magistrate. Thus
adequate allowance is made to meet those problems presented upon the arraign-
ment of a member of a criminal gang, while his fellow conspirators remain at
large,2 5 as well as upon the problem raised by the absence of committing magis-
trates due to holidays and the like.26 Incidental problems will arise from the
inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement
made by him may be used against him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant reason-
able time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as
provided in these rules."
(c) "The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. If the defendant waives pre-
liminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district
court. If the defendant does not waive examination, the commissioner shall hear the
evidence within a reasonable time. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against
him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. If from the evidence it appears to
the commissioner that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been com-
mitted and that the defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold
him to answer in the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him. The
commissioner shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules. After conclud-
ing the proceedings the commissioner shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of the district
court all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him." FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, Rule 5, 18 U.S.C.A.
21. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 412 (1948).
22. Orfield, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL, 79 (1947).
23. "Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such flagrant disregard
of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without
making the courts themselves accomplices in the willful disobedience of law." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1942).
24. An attempt was made to make this legislatively explicit in the preliminary draft
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 5(b) contained a proviso
that no statement made by the accused could be admitted in evidence against him if the
interrogation occurred while the accused was being held in violation of Rule 5. Orfield,
The Preliminary Draft Of The Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure, 22 Tax. L. RE. 37,
46 (1943). Due to varying criticism, this sanction was never adopted.
25. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated, "Imme-
diate arraignment of the first member of a criminal gang who is arrested, with the result-
ant public record and publicity, would frustrate plans of enforcement officers to apprehend
the other individuals and conspirators involved . . ." Comment, 42 MICH. L. Ray. 679,
690 (1944).
26. Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Walker,
176 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir. 1949). See, generally, Inbau, Legal Pitfalls To Avoid In Criminal
Interrogations, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (1949).
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varying interpretations which will be given "unnecessary delay" by the
federal courts, but deviation in this small area should be regarded as a neces-
sary incident of a properly constructed confession rule. In addition, it should
be noted that by emphasizing the importance of avoiding "unnecessary delay,"
in bringing the accused before a committing magistrate, the McNabb rule
establishes a clear standard which serves as a guide for police action.
Regardless of the rule adopted, confessions will seldom be forthcoming from
the hardened and financially able criminal2 7 The McNabb rule, however,
heightens the task of the law enforcement officer in his attempt to convict the
mentally incompetent or financially deficient wrongdoer. This barrier is in
sharp contrast with the situation which prevailed under the earlier voluntary-
trustworthy test where the accused was faced with the unbearable burden of
proving that his confession was secured with the aid of coercive devices. This
resulted from the fact that the ultimate determination narrowed down to a
weighing of the word of the accused against the statements of the police officers
who were the only persons present at the interrogation. Considering the record
and character of the average suspect, this was in reality, and insurmountable
task.28
In the instant case, the purpose of the McNabb-Upshaw rule was achieved.
Due to the apparently culpable acts of the marshal and the failure of the
accused to secure counsel, the benefits of Carignan's initial arraignment on the
attempted rape charge were greatly minimized. Barring those unusual events,
subsequent secret interrogation would have been prevented. The accused was
fully informed of his rights and an opportunity to secure counsel was accorded
him. There is no reason to assume that Carignan would not realize that those
rights also accrued to the greater crime of murder with which he was ultimately
charged. Thus, sufficient steps were taken by way of the first arraignment to
prevent secret interrogation under normal circumstances.
If the above analysis is utilized, the federal confession rule is workable and
effects a strong safeguard to prevent the use of coerced confessions. The im-
pediment to law enforcement which the rule supposedly creates can be compen-
sated for by the selection of a competent and trained police force. The current
trend in the confession field appears to be in the direction of providing more
adequate protection to the accused person.29 It is hoped that this trend will
continue and will not be altered by a reversal of the McNabb holding.
Editor's Note: The Supreme Court in U. S. v. Carignan, 20 U.S.L. Week 4013 (U.S.
Nov. 13, 1951) affred the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
had erred in not permitting Carignan to testify, in the absence of the jury, as to the
circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the confession. The majority also took the
view that the confession was procured during a period of lawful detention and thus did
not violate the McNabb rule. Justices Douglas, Black and Frankfurter concurred in the
result but were of the opinion that the McNabb rule had been violated.
27. See, generally, Hearings Before The Special Committee To Investigate Organized
Crime In Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 202, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
28. See, generally, McCormick, Some Problems And Developments In The Admissi-
bility Of Confessions, 24 Tx. L. REv. 239, 250 (1946).
29. "No statement, confession, or admission in writing shall be received in evidence
in any criminal proceeding against any defendant unless at the time of the taking thereof
such defendant shall have been furnished with a copy thereof and which statement, con-
fession or admission shall have endorsed thereon or attached thereto the receipt of the
accused which shall state that a copy thereof has been received by him." Minn. Laws
1951, c. 284, §611.033.
1951]
